Vivian Jensen (Widow of Henning Sven Jensen) v. Utah Labor Commission; Diamond Express LLC and Truck Insurance Exchange : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Vivian Jensen (Widow of Henning Sven Jensen) v.
Utah Labor Commission; Diamond Express LLC
and Truck Insurance Exchange : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Carrie T. Taylor, David H. Tolk; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Alan L. Hennebold; attorneys
for respondents.
H. Dennis Piercey; attorney for petitioner.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jensen v. Labor Commission, No. 20040372 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4966
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VIVIAN JENSEN (WIDOW OL 
11LNNINGSVEN JENSEN) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; 
DIAMOND EXPRESS EEC and 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Respondents. 
Carrie 'I.Taylor (6045) 
David II. Tolk (7650) 
RICHARDS. BRANDT. MIT I FR & 
NELSON 
50 South Main Street, S . . . 
P.O. Box 2465 
Null Lake City. I Hah 841 . 
lili-phomv (801)531-2000 
•rneys for Respondents Diamond 
Express and l-uek Insurance Iwehange 
Alan L. H e n ™ , . . ; , . . . 
Labor Commission ol" Ulali 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 144600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84I 14-4600 
Telephone: (801 j 530-6X00 
AI torn ev for rT';i-? ! °uor Commission 
Appeal iNo. 20040372 CA 
Again CJISC Mr. 2003489 
VIVIAN JENSEN 
II. Dennis Piereey (3746) 
938 Greenwood Terraee 
Salt Eake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801)582-6495 
A Homey for Petitioner Vivian Jensen 
BRIEF OF PETITIOIN 
Petition tor Review of Order and Decision of Utah Labor Commission 
PARTIES 
The caption contains the names of all parties before the Utah Labor Commission. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF LAW 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 16 
I. THE EMPLOYER AND CARRIER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
REWARDED AT THE EXPENSE OF VIVIAN JENSEN FOR THEIR 
VIOLATIONS OF HER RIGHTS 16 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-417(3) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 30 
III. DEATH BENEFITS SHOULD BE AWARDED 35 
CONCLUSION 36 
ADDENDUM 
Labor Commission Form 089 Record at 58 
Labor Commission Order Denying Motion for Review Record at 109-12 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Avis v. Board of Review. 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) 2, 31, 33 
Bevans v. Industrial Commission. 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 1-2 
Currier v.Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 1364-1365 (Utah App. 1993) 35 
Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes. 2004 UT App 391, ffl[ 14-15, P.3d 19 
Denny's Restaurant v. Bell. 659 So. 2d 1374, 1374-75 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) 18 
Fowler v. Titus Manufacturing Co.. 734 P.2d 1309 (Okla. App. 1986) 17 
In re Marriage of Gonzalez. 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074 34-35 
Grand County v. Emery County. 2002 UT 57, 57 P.3d 1148 2 
Gulf Casualty Co. v. Hughes. 230 S.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). . . .18, 26 
Hailing v. Industrial Commission. 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78, 81 (1927) 33 
Harris v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services. 
592 A.2d 1014, 1016-19 (D.C. 1991), vacated. 648 A.2d 672 (D.C. 1994) . . . . 18 
Interstate Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission. 591 P.2d 436,438 (Utah 1979) 18 
Johnson v. Redevelopment. 2001 UT 67, 913 P.2d 723 1-2 
McGregor v. PIP Johnson Construction Co.. 721 S.W.2d 708, 709-710 (Ky. 1987). . 18 
Mills v. Habluetzel. 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982) 34-35 
Miller v. Weaver. 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592 1-2 
Parks v. Utah Transit Authority. 2002 UT 55, 53 P.3d 43 2 
Reynolds v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 117 Cal. Rptr. 79, 
527 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1974) 18 
Savage Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d664 (Utah 1991). . . 1-2 
State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Foulds. 167 Colo. 123, 
445 P.2d 716, 718-19 (1968) 18, 26 
van der Hevde v. First Colony Insurance Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 278-80 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) 18 
Vigos v. Mountainland Builder's. Inc.. 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 207 16-18, 24, 35 
Workers' Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission. 761 P.2d 572 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 2,12, 36 
Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Constitution art. I, § 7 32 
ii 
Utah Constitution art. I, § 11 32 
Utah Constitution art. I, § 24 6, 32 
Utah Constitution art. XVI, § 5 6, 32 
United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, § 1 6, 34 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 26 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(4)-(5) (2001) & (5)-(6) (current) 3, 9-10, 19-21, 23, 30, 33 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2)-(3) 1, 5, 7, 13, 15-16, 23, 30, 33-34 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-603 9, 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) 1-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28 33 
Rules 
Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1-3 5, 12, 27-29 
Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1-7 4, 9, 11, 21, 28 
Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-2-3.D 27 
iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Labor Commission err in dismissing Vivian Jensen's death claim based 
on the limitation period in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) when she filed her claim 
only 3 months and 9 days after the one-year anniversary of her husband's death due to 
the employer's and carrier's violations of her workers' compensation rights prior to 
expiration of the limitations period? 
Standard of review. Correction of error. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4); Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); 
Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Miller v. 
Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592; Johnson v. Redevelopment, 2001 UT 67, 913 P.2d 
723. This issue was preserved before the Labor Commission. See, e.g.. Record at 30-59, 
63-75, 99-108. 
2. In the alternative, if the Labor Commission did not err in applying Utah 
workers' compensation law, is Vivian Jensen entitled to consideration of her death claim 
on the grounds that any requirement that she file the claim within one year is a violation 
of her rights under the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution in that Utah 
workers' compensation law impermissibly and arbitrarily imposes such a short time 
limitation on death claims while allowing six years for filing even minimal non-death 
workers' compensation claims. 
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Standard of review. The Labor Commission left this issue for first consideration 
by the Court of Appeals based on Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Record at 110. Generally, 
correction of error applies to constitutional issues when they have been addressed below. 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) & (d); Grand County v. Emery County, 
2002 UT 57, 57 P.3d 1148; Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002 UT 55, 53 P.3d 473. 
In addition to the determination of the Labor Commission that this issue could be raised 
only in this appeal, the issue was preserved. Record at 44-48, 63-64, 106, 110. 
3. Should Vivian Jensen be awarded workers5 compensation benefits due to her 
husband's death in a violent work accident under the circumstances established in the 
record, particularly given the absence of any justification in the denial letter of the carrier 
for refusing to pay benefits? 
Standard of review. Correction of error. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4); Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); 
Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Miller v. 
Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592; Johnson v. Redevelopment, 2001 UT 67, 913 P.2d 
723. This issue was preserved before the Labor Commission, but the issue was not 
reached because of the Commission's error in dismissing Mrs. Jensen's claim as 
untimely. See, e.g.. Record at 32, 48, 63, 106. No purpose would be served by remand 
to the Labor Commission because denial of benefits under the circumstances would be 
improper as a matter of law. See Workers' Compensation Fund v. Industrial 
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Commission. 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(4)-(5) (2001)1 stated: 
(4) (a) In the form prescribed by the division, each employer shall file a report 
with the division of any: 
(i) work-related fatality; or 
(ii) work-related injury resulting in: 
(A) medical treatment; 
(B) loss of consciousness; 
(C) loss of work; 
(D) restriction of work; or 
(E) transfer to another job. 
(b) The employer shall file the report required by Subsection (4)(a) within 
seven days after: 
(i) the occurrence of a fatality or injury; 
(ii) the employer's first knowledge of the fatality or injury; or 
(iii) the employee's notification of the fatality or injury. 
( c ) . . . . 
( d ) . . . . 
(5) Each employer shall provide the employee with: 
(a) a copy of the report submitted to the division; and 
(b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's rights and 
responsibilities related to the industrial injury. 
2. The Division's Employee's Guide to Workers' Compensation (Record at 67-
75) states in part that workers' compensation includes burial and dependent benefits in 
case of death (Q 9 & Q 18) and regarding "RESOLUTION" states: 
Q 31. WHAT DO I DO IF MY CLAIM IS DENIED? 
A. First talk with the insurance carrier or self-insured employer to find out why 
^ tah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407 was amended in 2003. At the time of the accident 
in January 2002, the obligations to provide a copy of the employer's report of injury and 
a statement of employee rights and responsibilities were in subsection (5) rather than, as 
now, in subsection (6). 
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your claim has been denied. If they lack information required to accept a claim, 
you can obtain the missing information and resubmit the claim. If this is 
unsuccessful, call the Division of Industrial Accidents with the Labor Commission 
at 530-6800 or toll free (800) 530-5090. The staff may be able to assist you with 
your claim or possibly file an application for hearing. 
CLAIMS RESOLUTION CONFERENCE 
The Utah Labor Commission now offers a program to resolve disputes that exist 
between the parties of a workers' compensation claim. Using Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) the parties agree to meet, and with the help of a neutral person, 
develop solutions, which resolve the issue(s) and mutually benefit both parties. If 
you are interested in requesting such a conference, please contact the Division of 
Industrial Accidents with the Labor Commission at 530-6800 or toll free (800) 
530-5090. 
Q 32 
Q 33. DO I NEED AN ATTORNEY TO HELP WITH MY CLAIM OR 
FILING FOR A HEARING? 
A. An attorney is not required for filing a claim or filing for a hearing. However, 
if you choose an attorney, they must accept your case on a contingency basis. 
Your attorney's fees will come out of your compensation if you win. NOTE: The 
Labor Commission has staff available to explain your rights and responsibilities 
regarding workers' compensation. 
Original emphasis. 
3. Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1 -7.A-B states: 
A. Upon receiving a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the 
insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall promptly investigate the claim and 
begin payment of compensation within 21 days from the date of notification of a 
valid claim or the insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall send the 
claimant and the division written notice on a division form or letter containing 
similar information, within 21 days of notification, that further investigation is 
needed stating the reasons(s) for further investigation. Each insurance carrier or 
self-insured employer shall complete its investigation within 45 days of receipt of 
the claim and shall commence the payment of benefits or notify the claimant and 
division in writing that the claim is denied and the reason(s) why the claim is 
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being denied. 
B. The payment of compensation shall be considered overdue if not paid 
within 21 days of a valid claim or within the 45 days of investigation unless 
denied. 
4. Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1 -3.E-F states: 
E. "Employee Notification of Denial of Claim - Form 089" - This form is 
used by insurance carriers or self-insured employers to notify the claimant that his 
or her claim, in whole or part, is denied and the reason(s) why the claim is being 
denied. An insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall complete its 
investigation within 45 days of receipt of the claim and shall commence the 
payment of benefits or notify the claimant and the division in writing that the 
claim, in whole or part, is denied. 
F. "Insurance Carriers/ Self-Insurer's Notice of Further Investigation of a 
Workers1 Compensation Claim - Form 441" - This form is used by insurance 
carriers or self-insured employers to notify the claimant and the commission that 
further investigation is needed and the reasons for further investigation. This form 
or letter containing similar information is to be filed within 21 days of notification 
of claim that further investigation is needed. 
5. Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1-3.V states: 
V. The division may approve change of any of the above forms upon 
public notice. Carriers may print these forms or approved versions. 
6. Official Form 089, Record at 58 (copied in Addendum), states in part: 
NOTICE TO THE CLAIMANT: If you are in disagreement with the denial 
and cannot resolve your differences by talking with thee carrier and/or your 
treating physician, you can file for mediation and/or application for hearing. 
To obtain an application for mediation and/or hearing, contact the Utah 
Labor Commission, Division of Industrial Accident at (801) 530-6800 or 
(800) 530-5090. 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2)-(3) states: 
(2) (a) A claim described in Subsection (2)(b) is barred, unless the employee: 
(i) files an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication no 
later than six years from the date of the accident; and 
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( i i ) . . . . 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies to a claim for compensation for: 
(i) temporary total disability benefits; 
(ii) temporary partial disability benefits; 
(iii) permanent partial disability benefits; or 
(iv) permanent total disability benefits, 
( c ) . . . . 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is filed 
within one year of the date of death of the employee. 
8. Utah Constitution art. I, § 24 states: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
9. Utah Constitution art. XVI, § 5 states: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall 
never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any 
statutory limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in 
death is provided for by law. 
10. United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, § 1 states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Vivian Jensen, seeks workers' compensation benefits due to the 
death of her husband, Henning Sven Jensen, on a Saturday evening, January 26, 2002, 
after driving his employer's truck from Salt Lake City as far as icy Interstate 90 just 
outside of Butte, Montana and suffering an accident that left his head crushed and pinned 
under the heavily-loaded vehicle. Record at 1-2, 4-9. A First Report of Injury was 
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completed by the employer, Diamond Express, on January 28, 2002 and filed with the 
Labor Commission but without a copy being provided to Mrs. Jensen. Record at 51, 56. 
The workers' compensation carrier for the employer, Truck Insurance Exchange 
prepared a denial letter dated March 8, 2002; this time the document was sent to Mrs. 
Jensen but without a copy being provided to the Labor Commission. Record Index; 
Record at 27, 57. 
The decisions of the Labor Commission in this matter were based solely on the 
written submissions in the record; no evidence or argument was presented at any hearing. 
On May 5, 2003, 3 months and 9 days after the one-year anniversary of Mr. Jensen's 
death, Mrs. Jensen filed her Claim for Dependent's Benefits and/or Burial Benefits. 
Record at 1. On July 11, 2003, the employer and carrier moved to dismiss for failure to 
file the claim within one year under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3). Record at 19-25. 
After Mrs. Jensen's response establishing that she was entitled to benefits and that any 
lateness was a result of the employer's and carrier's earlier violation of duties owed to 
her, Record at 30-58, the administrative law judge ruled on October 2, 2003 that "the 
only exception to this limitation [Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3)] is the tolling of the 
statute during the period of minority of minor dependents of the deceased worker," 
which was not involved in this case. Record at 60-61. Mrs. Jensen's motion for review 
filed October 27, 2003, Record at 63-65, was denied on April 20, 2004. Record at 109-
112 (copied in Addendum). The Commission concluded that it could not "attribute Mrs. 
Jensen's failure to timely file her Application to Truck Insurance Exchange." Record at 
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110. Mrs. Jensen filed this appeal. See Record at 113. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Henning Sven Jensen died in an accident toward the end of a day-long drive from 
Salt Lake City after sliding off a highway covered by "a layer of ice from shoulder to 
shoulder," near Butte, Montana on January 26, 2002. Record at 5-6, 56. The 
temperature was below freezing, and the ground was covered with two inches of snow. 
Record at 6. His employer's truck rolled and crushed his head, leaving him pinned under 
the truck. Record at 5-9. The truck, weighted down with a load of doors, came down on 
Mr. Jensen with such force that the truck itself suffered significant structural damage. 
Record at 4, 6-7. 
Blood and tissue stains depicted in photographs of the truck are testament to the 
violence Mr. Jensen suffered in the accident. Record at 51. The deputy coroner, not a 
physician, listed the immediate cause of death on the death certificate as myocardial 
infarction, or heart attack. Record at 2. No underlying basis for the "heart attack" 
conclusion is stated in the death certificate, Record at 2, or anywhere else in the record. 
The death certificate also fails to refer at all to the accident and leaves the "injury" boxes 
blank, including the question of whether or not there was an injury at work. Record at 2. 
There is no finding in the record that any heart attack was not related to the stress of Mr. 
Jensen's work in having to deal with icy, night-time driving conditions, not to mention 
having his head crushed and trapped under the truck. The only evidence in the record 
directly addressing whether the injuries in the accident were a factor is the assurance of 
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the highway patrol reported in the Deseret News that Mr. Jensen, "who was wearing a 
seat belt, was partially ejected and crushed, his death the result of those injuries and not 
the heart attack." Record at 9, 54. Indeed, Mr. Jensen was alone in the vehicle and there 
is no evidence that Mr. Jensen suffered any heart attack before the truck fell on his head 
and left him pinned to the ground. Record at 5-7. Rather the officer who prepared the 
police report arrived at 6:37 p.m. to find Mr. Jensen still pinned under the truck 
approximately one-half hour after the accident, Record at 5-7, and Mr. Jensen was not 
pronounced dead by the deputy coroner until 13 minutes after that, Record at 2. 
Mrs. Vivian Jensen, Mr. Jensen's wife of over 36 years, is the dependent entitled 
to workers' compensation benefits due to Mr. Jensen's death. Record at 3. Despite 
Utah Administrative Code Ann. R612-1-7.A, the employer and carrier failed to 
reasonably and promptly investigate her claim. First, the employer and carrier failed to 
obtain the information that would be available through an autopsy performed under Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-603. Record at 2, 33, 50-51. Instead, two days after the accident, 
asked by Form 122 "Employer's First Report of Injury" "HOW INJURY OR 
ILLNESS/ABNORMAL HEALTH CONDITION OCCURRED. DESCRIBE THE 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND INCLUDE OBJECTS OR SUBSTANCES THAT 
DIRECTLY INJURED THE EMPLOYEE OR MADE THE EMPLOYEE ILL," the 
employer and carrier completely ignored the violence of the accident in which Mr. Jensen 
died crushed and trapped under the truck and reported simply that "according to coroners 
[sic] statement he died of a heart attack." Record at 56. Despite Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
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2-407(5)(a), neither the employer nor carrier provided a copy of the Employer's First 
Report of Injury to Mrs. Jensen. Having been informed by a police officer that her 
husband had died in an accident, Record at 50, expecting some sort of compensation 
because of his death on the job, Record at 51, and deprived of the hint of what was to 
come reflected in the Employer's First Report of Injury, Ms. Jensen permitted cremation 
of Mr. Jensen's body on January 31, 2002, Record at 51. 
Despite Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(5)(b) (2001), the employer also failed to 
provide Mrs. Jensen with any statement of "employee's rights and responsibilities related 
to the industrial injury." Id- The Labor Commission's "Employee's Guide to Workers' 
Compensation" (Record at 67-75) would have informed Mrs. Jensen that workers' 
compensation would pay for burial and dependent benefits in case of death (Q 9 & Q 18) 
and further informed her regarding "RESOLUTION": 
Q31. WHAT DO I DO IF MY CLAIM IS DENIED? 
A. First talk with the insurance carrier or self-insured employer to find out why 
your claim has been denied. If they lack information required to accept a claim, 
you can obtain the missing information and resubmit the claim. If this is 
unsuccessful, call the Division of Industrial Accidents with the Labor Commission 
at 530-6800 or toll free (800) 530-5090. The staff may be able to assist you with 
your claim or possibly file an application for hearing. 
CLAIMS RESOLUTION CONFERENCE 
The Utah Labor Commission now offers a program to resolve disputes that exist 
between the parties of a workers' compensation claim. Using Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) the parties agree to meet, and with the help of a neutral person, 
develop solutions, which resolve the issue(s) and mutually benefit both parties. If 
you are interested in requesting such a conference, please contact the Division of 
Industrial Accidents with the Labor Commission at 530-6800 or toll free (800) 
530-5090. 
10 
Q 32 
Q 33. DO I NEED AN ATTORNEY TO HELP WITH MY CLAIM OR 
FILING FOR A HEARING? 
A. An attorney is not required for filing a claim or filing for a hearing. However, 
if you choose an attorney, they must accept your case on a contingency basis. 
Your attorney's fees will come out of your compensation if you win. NOTE: The 
Labor Commission has staff available to explain your rights and responsibilities 
regarding workers' compensation. 
Record at 67, 69, 71, 73-74 (original emphasis). 
Despite Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1-7.A, the employer and carrier failed to 
do other things that they were required to do before they could deny payment, including 
(1) providing within 21 days of her claim a written "further-investigation" notice to Mrs. 
Jensen and the workers' compensation division "that further investigation is needed 
stating the reason(s) for further investigation," see Record Index; and (2) providing 
within 45 days written notice to Mrs. Jensen and the workers' compensation division 
"that the claim is denied and the reason(s) why the claim is being denied," see Record 
Index; Record at 27, 57. All the carrier did was send to Mrs. Jensen alone (nothing was 
sent to the workers' compensation division) a denial. See Record Index; Record at 27, 
57, 109. Nothing in the March 8,2002 denial improved on the failure of the Employer's 
First Report of Injury 39 days earlier to address Mr. Jensen's work accident. Although it 
is crystal clear that, even absent the type of violent accident suffered by Mr. Jensen, death 
due to heart attack "while . . . driving a truck for his employer," particularly long-
11 
distance driving in difficult weather conditions,2 is compensable, Workers' 
Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 572, 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
the carrier's denial misrepresented to Mrs. Jensen that the carrier "must regretfully deny 
any benefits of workers [sic] compensation" and noted inconsequentially that "[b]ased 
upon the death certificate and the police report, he died of a heart attack." Record at 27, 
57. The summary denial letter made no reference to the fact noted in the police report 
that the truck had rolled and landed on Mr. Jensen's head. Record at 5. 
The carrier also denied the claim in a way that for yet another time deprived Mrs. 
Jensen of critical information about the ease with which she could obtain assistance with 
her claim from the Labor Commission. The Labor Commission's official Form 89 for 
employers denying a claim in whole or in part, see Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1-3.E 
and Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1-3.V, would have provided this notice3 to Mrs. 
2In Workers' Compensation Fund, the employee suffering the heart attack was a 
56-year-old man, 5'8M and 190 pounds, with a 36-year smoking habit and emphysema. 
761P.2dat573. 
3Mrs. Jensen has learned subsequent to filing this appeal that had the carrier sent a 
copy of the denial to the Labor Commission as required by rule, the Labor Commission, 
as a matter of practice not disclosed by any rule, would have sent out a letter to notify 
Mrs. Jensen of its availability to assist her. Due to the carrier's failure, no such letter was 
sent. 
We were also informed that workers' compensation agencies in other states 
routinely and actively evaluate workers' compensation denials when they are received to 
assure that the rights of workers and their dependents are protected, but that the Utah 
Labor Commission has no such policy and appears for various reasons, possibly 
including its levels of funding, to place this burden entirely on those who have been 
wrongly denied benefits. 
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Jensen: 
NOTICE TO THE CLAIMANT: If you are in disagreement with the denial 
and cannot resolve your differences by talking with the carrier and/or your 
treating physician, you can file for mediation and/or application for hearing. 
To obtain an application for mediation and/or hearing, contact the Utah 
Labor Commission, Division of Industrial Accident at (801) 530-6800 or 
(800) 530-5090. 
Record at 58 (copied in Addendum). 
Mrs. Jensen was the quintessential example of a claimant in need of the 
information that she should have received from the employer and carrier in accordance 
with Labor Commission rules. In the days following her husband's death, despite her 
expectation that she would receive benefits because of the accident, Mrs. Jensen knew 
nothing about the reasons death benefits were available in connection with Mr. Jensen's 
employment or what plans or laws applied and knew nothing about the Labor 
Commission or any involvement that any public agency might have with any benefits that 
could be paid. Even up to the filing of her claim for benefits on May 5, 2003 and 
notwithstanding intervening legal representation, Record at 35, 51-52, Mrs. Jensen knew 
nothing about how workers' compensation worked and was unaware of any related rights 
and responsibilities and applicable legal standards, including without limitation, (1) any 
one-year provision of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3); (2) her right to seek free 
assistance without the aid of an attorney from the expert staff of the Labor Commission; 
(3) her right to seek mediation through the Labor Commission; (4) her right or need to 
file an application for hearing; or (5) that she may be entitled to benefits even if a heart 
attack was involved or that the heart attack conclusion in the death certificate could be 
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disputed. Record at 36, 52. Mrs. Jensen considered any benefits due because of her 
husband's death to be a matter of great importance to her, and believes she did her best to 
pursue her claim based on the information that she had. Record at 36, 52. She 
immediately would have sought assistance regarding her claim from the Labor 
Commission, would have sought mediation, and would have submitted her claim for 
benefits within one year, had she received notice of her rights and responsibilities related 
to workers' compensation and the availability of the Labor Commission to assist with her 
claim. Record at 36, 52. 
As a direct result of violations of the employer and carrier of Mrs. Jensen's rights 
under workers' compensation law, Mrs. Jensen filed her claim for benefits on May 5, 
2003, 3 months and 9 days after the one-year anniversary of Mr. Jensen's death. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the workers' compensation process is initiated by the employer and the 
carrier rather than the claimant and is thus so much within the knowledge and control of 
the employer and carrier, courts are less strict with workers' compensation time 
limitations when good cause exists for excusing the sort of minimal untimeliness that is 
claimed in this case. 
The Labor Commission was wrong to give the employer and carrier, not only 
short shrift, but in effect a huge reward for their violations of Mrs. Jensen's rights. Mrs. 
Jensen knew nothing about workers' compensation and had a critical need for 
information to which she was entitled by law. But for the employer's and carrier's 
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violations of law, Mrs. Jensen would have been informed that she did not need an 
attorney to file her claim because all she needed to do was call the Labor Commission at 
530-6800 and its expert staff would tell her what she needed to know and help her file 
her claim if necessary, including through ADR. Record at 39-41, 58, 67, 68, 73-75. 
Mrs. Jensen's legal representation at one point is the opposite of a reason to 
punish her with loss of her rights against the employer and carrier. To do so, treats 
diligent claimants like Mrs. Jensen who persistently pursue their claim, including by 
consulting legal counsel, less favorably than a less-diligent claimant would be. That is 
backwards, especially because part of the harm that the employer and carrier caused her 
was that she went to an attorney and not to the Labor Commission. Her legal 
representation neither caused nor prevented the harm that the employer and carrier 
caused Mrs. Jensen. Her rights against the employer and carrier are separate and of the 
utmost importance especially because other supposed "rights" against her attorneys may 
prove illusory on the merits or as a practical matter due to associated expenses and risks 
that she is unable to bear. 
Under Utah constitutional law, constitutional issues should only be reached when 
necessary. There is no need to address constitutional issues here because the employer's 
and carrier's violations of Mrs. Jensen's rights strongly support this Court's ordering 
payment of benefits. Alternatively, Mrs. Jensen submits that the extraordinarily short 
one-year limitation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) for death claims is in general 
improper, particularly in view of the contrastingly generous six-year limitation of Utah 
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Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2) permitted for other workers' compensation claims, no matter 
how insubstantial. The huge difference makes no sense especially in light of the fact that 
the same injury to an employee can give rise to both types of claims. 
Given the undisputed facts relating to Mr. Jensen's accident and the absence of 
any valid reason for denial of benefits asserted in the carrier's denial letter, Mrs. Jensen 
should have been paid death benefits long ago. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE EMPLOYER/CARRIER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
REWARDED AT THE EXPENSE OF VIVIAN JENSEN FOR 
THEIR VIOLATIONS OF HER RIGHTS 
Utah law seeks to promote the ideal of an employer/carrier-administered workers' 
compensation insurance scheme "designed to avoid the costs and difficulties inherent in 
the common law tort system it supplanted, [in which] injured employees need not 
undertake the burdensome and expensive task of proving the cause of their injuries." 
Vigos v. Mountainland Builder's. Inc.. 2000 UT 2, % 40, 993 P.2d 207 (Russon, J., 
concurring) (brackets added) (citation omitted). Two critical ways in which Utah law 
tries to achieve this goal is by placing on workers' compensation employers and carriers 
obligations of investigating the claim and informing claimants of their rights and 
responsibilities, including their right to free assistance with their claim from the Utah 
Labor Commission. In fact, 
[Injured employees] are encouraged not to invest in expensive legal counsel, and 
they have every incentive to rely on the advice and instructions provided by their 
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employer, their employer's insurer, and the Commission. If the scheme functions 
as it should, all these parties work together to provide the benefits to which an 
injured employee is legitimately entitled, and none of the parties seek to 
manipulate the system or avoid obligations. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This case reflects the tension between the goals of the workers' compensation 
system and the conflicting self-interest of an employer and carrier. In this case, self-
interest won out as the employer and carrier focused their efforts on trying to get rid of 
the claim rather than on investigating it and proceeded at every turn in the way most 
likely to leave Mrs. Jensen in the dark about how to obtain fair, efficient and inexpensive 
consideration of her claim. 
In contrast to the procedure in civil actions, workers' compensation procedure 
even begins, not with the claimant, but rather with the employer and carrier. Because the 
workers' compensation process is so much within the knowledge and control of the 
employer and carrier, courts have reason to be less strict with workers' compensation 
time limitations when good cause (particularly a failure by the employer and carrier) 
exists for excusing the sort of minimal untimeliness that is claimed in this case. Under 
analogous circumstances in Fowler v. Titus Manufacturing Co.. 734 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 
App. 1986), the court concluded: 
To slam the courthouse doors in the face of this unfortunate woman under the 
circumstances presented in this record and tell her that she not only cannot get any 
compensation for her injury but that she must labor long hours to pay the 
enormous doctor and hospital bills that should have long ago been paid by 
respondents would not only be repugnant to the intent, purpose and meaning of 
the Worker's Compensation Act, but to our sense of justice and fairness. 
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Id. at 1313; see also Vigos v. Mountainland Builder's. Inc.. 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 2074; 
Interstate Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 591 P.2d 436, 438 (Utah 1979) (even 
absent express language in statute, implied condition permitting reasonable excuse for 
late notice); Reynolds v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 117 Cal. Rptr. 79, 527 
P.2d631, 632-33 (1974); State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Foulds, 167 Colo. 123, 
445 P.2d 716, 718-19 (1968); Harris v. District of Columbia Department of Employment 
Services, 592 A.2d 1014, 1016-19 (D.C. 1991)5; Denny's Restaurant v. BelL 659 So. 2d 
1374, 1374-75 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (claim of untimeliness barred by failure of 
employer/carrier to provide required disclosure); McGregor v. PIP Johnson Construction 
Co., 721 S.W.2d 708, 709-710 (Ky. 1987); Gulf Casualty Co. v. Hughes, 230 S.W.2d 
293, 296-97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). This Court's decision in van der Heyde v. First 
Colony Insurance Co., 845 P.2d 275, 278-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (violation of life 
insurance replacement regulations) also stands squarely for the proposition that a 
defendant may be estopped from relying on a defense when its own conduct or failure 
has deprived the claimant of protections that would have allowed the claimant to avoid 
4Although Vigos involved some initial payments of the claim as opposed to the 
initial denial in this case, its holding was that conduct of the employer and carrier may 
excuse the claimant from being required to request a hearing within the time provided by 
statute. See id. ^ ff 12-24. The Court considered the purposes behind the statute of 
limitations and workers' compensation generally and determined the claim was 
consistent with them. Id. ^ | 21-24. 
5The Harris opinion, which concluded that the claim was timely, was later vacated 
based on a stipulation that the claim indeed was timely. See 648 A.2d 672, 672-74 (D.C. 
1994). 
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the very harm that the defendant seeks to impose on the claimant. See Dahl Investment 
Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, ffl[ 14-15, P.3d (equitable estoppel). 
The Labor Commission implicitly appeared to accept that an employer and its 
carrier should not be able to take advantage of a claimant's failure to file within a certain 
time frame if the failure is attributable to them. Record at 110. The Commission also 
appeared to agree with Mrs. Jensen that the employer and carrier failed in two important 
ways as it stated that "Mrs. Jensen also points out that Truck Insurance Exchange failed 
to comply with § 34A-2-407(5) [(2001)] of the Act by providing her with copies of the 
'Employer's First Report of Accident' and 'Employees' Guide to Workers' 
Compensation."1 Record at 110. However, the Commission also noted "[a]s a 
preliminary matter,.. . that § 34A-2-407(5) requires the referenced documents be 
provided to 'employees.' Arguably, the statute's directive does not extend to 
'dependents' such as Mrs. Jensen." Record at 110. The Commission forgave the 
violations of the employer and carrier because "apart from this question of semantics, it is 
undisputed that Mrs. Jensen was aware by March 8, 2002, that Truck Insurance 
Exchange had denied her claim. She then immediately obtained legal representation to 
challenge that denial. Her legal counsel later withdrew and, unfortunately, gave her 
incorrect advice[6] regarding the filing deadline." Record at 110. 
6This conclusion of "incorrect advice" deviates from the record, which does not 
reflect what advice she received but rather establishes only the critical fact that she 
herself did not understand from it that she was in danger of losing her workers' 
compensation claim if she did not act in one year. Record at 35-36, 52. Were there no 
other error in the Labor Commission's analysis, remand to the Labor Commission would 
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It is unclear whether the so-called "question of semantics" entered into the refusal 
of the Commission to sanction the employer and carrier for their violations of Mrs. 
Jensen's rights, but it should not have. Mrs. Jensen had a right to the information 
mandated by the statute. In addition, the critical harm caused to her by the violation of 
the statute by the employer and carrier was in no way cured by the denial letter7 (which to 
the contrary exacerbated the harm caused to Mrs. Jensen with more violations of her 
rights as discussed below) or by the subsequent, and temporary, legal representation. 
First, addressing the so-called "question of semantics," although the statute might 
have been drafted differently, it clearly applies to death cases, Subsection (4) of the 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(4) (2001) (now subsection (5)), unambiguously 
requires a report to be filed with the workers' compensation division "of any: (i) work-
related fatality." The report was filed in this case. See Record at 56. The statute then 
requires the employer to "provide the employee with: (a) a copy of the report submitted 
to the division; and (b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's rights 
and responsibilities related to the industrial injury." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(5) 
be appropriate to determine how this error affected the decision. However, as discussed 
in more detail below, Mrs. Jensen contends that the error is inconsequential because, 
regardless of whether or not there was "incorrect advice," the damage done to her by the 
failures of the employer and carrier were in no way abated by her temporarily obtaining 
out-of-state legal representation. 
7It seems doubtful that the Labor Commission's meant to suggest that Mrs. 
Jensen's receipt of the deficient denial (discussed further below) alone should excuse the 
other separate violations of Mrs. Jensen's rights by the employer and carrier. That would 
be like reasoning that driving within the speed limit excuses running a red light while 
driving on the wrong side of the road. 
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(2001) (now subsection (6)). Because the "report submitted to the division" includes 
reports of fatalities and furthermore because subsection (4)(b)(iii) requires filing of the 
report within seven days of, among other things, the "employee's notification of the 
fatality,"8 the only reasonable question if these provisions are read together is not 
whether a deceased employee, or for that matter a comatose or otherwise incompetent 
employee, is entitled to the report copy and the statement of rights, but how.9 In this 
case, the answer was easy. Just as the employer paid Mr. Jensen through Mrs. Jensen 
after his death for his work on the day of his death and reported it on his W-2 as part of 
his wages and other compensation received in 2002, see Record at 56 ("FULL PAY FOR 
DAY OF INJURY? YES"), and the carrier informed her that it "must regretfully deny 
any benefits of workers compensation for your late husband," Record at 27, 57 (emphasis 
added), the employer and carrier were obligated to honor his rights under the statute by 
providing the required documents to his dependent, Mrs. Jensen. Only a construction 
8Subsection (4)(b)(iii) in particular reflects the broad scope of the statute. 
Subsection (4)(b)(iii) reference to "employee's notification of the fatality" has to extend 
to the employee's dependent's notification of the fatality, because it cannot be referring 
only to the dead employee. If "[a]rguably, the statute's directive does not extend to 
'dependents' such as Mrs. Jensen," see Record at 110, then subsection (4)(b)(iii) is 
unacceptably robbed of all meaning. 
9R612-1-7.C5 contains a similar "ambiguity" in that it provides that a written 
denial need not occur within 45 days if "[claimant is not an employee of the employer . . 
.." In contrast to their narrow reading of the statute in written arguments before the 
Commission, the employer and carrier appear to concede the common sense meaning of 
this rule is that a claimant that is a dependent of an actual deceased employee is not 
within this exception and is entitled to the same timely payment or denial of the claim to 
which employees are entitled. See Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Disposition (6/15/04), La. (sixth and seventh page). 
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that consistently applies the statute to all cases, including death cases, promotes justice 
and effects the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 
('The statutes . . . , and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.") 
Indeed, it would have been an irrational denial of equal protection and uniform operation 
of laws10 for the legislature to have done differently and mandated a copy of the report 
and the statement of rights be provided in nondeath cases involving even minor injuries, 
but not in the far more serious cases involving a death on the job. 
What would have happened if the employer and carrier had provided to Mrs. 
Jensen the required copy of the report and the statement of rights? At least two things. 
First, Mrs. Jensen would have been able to see in the report, which the employer signed 
three days before Mrs. Jensen allowed Mr. Jensen's body to be cremated without an 
autopsy, the first indication of what evolved into the employer's and carrier's groundless 
"heart attack" excuse and disregard of the injuries her husband suffered. Record at 33, 
51, 56. Unlike the employer and carrier who were taking their position at the same time 
that they were electing not to preserve evidence directly related to the issue by requesting 
an autopsy, see Record at 2, 4, 33, 50-51, 56 and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-603, Mrs. 
Jensen had no clue that the employer and carrier were preparing to attempt to deprive her 
of the benefits to which she was entitled. Record at 50-51. 
Second, had Mrs. Jensen received an adequate statement of the rights and 
10The constitutional issues are further discussed below. 
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responsibilities under workers' compensation as she should have pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-407(5) (2001), she would have been informed directly of the one-year 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) because there is no more important 
responsibility for a workers' compensation claimant to know than a deadline for taking 
action. But even if Mrs. Jensen had only been provided the Division's Employee's 
Guide to Workers' Compensation11 (Revised July 2001), Record at 67-75, she would 
have had concise and important information related to her claim. Again and again, she 
would have been informed that all she needed to do was call the Labor Commission and 
they would tell her what she needed to know and help her file her claim if necessary. 
Record at 39-40, 67, 68, 73, 74, 75. She would have learned that: "An attorney is not 
required for filing a claim or filing for a hearing.... NOTE: The Labor Commission has 
staff available to explain your rights and responsibilities regarding workers' 
compensation." Record at 74. She would have learned about the Labor Commission's 
mediation program: 
The Utah Labor Commission now offers a program to resolve disputes that exist 
between the parties of a workers' compensation claim. Using Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) the parties agree to meet, and with the help of a neutral person, 
develop solutions, which resolve the issue(s) and mutually benefit both parties. If 
you are interested in requesting such a conference, please contact the Division of 
Industrial Accidents with the Labor Commission at 530-6800 or toll free (800) 
530-5090. 
nOddly, the Employee's Guide refers to several time limitations, including the six-
year limitation for temporary total claims, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2) and 
Record at 74, but in its discussion of death benefits, fails to mention the one-year 
limitation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2), Record at 69, 71. 
23 
Record at 73-74. The "help" telephone number—530-6800—that Mrs. Jensen needed was 
highlighted repeatedly in Labor Commission documents that she should have received 
but did not due to repeated violations of law committed by the employer and carrier. 
Then all she would have needed to do was make that call—one call. And she would 
have. Record at 36, 52. 
Given the principles that the Commission appeared to accept, it arrived at the 
wrong result. Viewed in light of the employer's and carrier's abysmal performance of 
their workers' compensation obligations in this case, the extreme sanction of dismissal 
imposed on Mrs. Jensen was draconian and created a double standard of ready 
forgiveness of the employer and carrier for multiple violations, including failures to 
adhere to time limitations, that injured Mrs. Jensen and severe punishment of her for a 
single, brief, and understandable slip that did nothing to prejudice the employer and 
carrier. 
In looking past the employer and carrier to the fact that Mrs. Jensen at one point 
obtained legal representation, the Labor Commission did nothing less than punish Mrs. 
Jensen for her diligence. Nothing that her former attorneys did or did not do caused the 
violations of Mrs. Jensen's rights by the employer and carrier, which violations preceded 
the legal representation, and nothing in the legal representation of Mrs. Jensen protected 
her from the direct harm she suffered from those violations or is inconsistent with her 
claims against the employer and carrier. Workers' compensation rights are of singular 
importance. Vigos v. Mountainland Builder's. Inc.. 2000 UT 2, ^ 40, 993 P.2d 207, 
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recognizes that civil actions are far more difficult, complicated, and expensive than 
administrative workers' compensation proceedings conducted with the aid of the 
resources, expertise, and simplified procedures of the Labor Commission. Depriving 
Mrs. Jensen's of her right to an appropriate remedy against the employer and carrier for 
the harm they caused her because she may also have a separate right, which may prove 
illusory, against another party is as unprincipled as it would be to refuse a workers' 
compensation claim because a third party also may be responsible for the injury. The 
record in this matter does not establish what the former attorneys did or failed to do but 
rather only Mrs. Jensen's good-faith understanding after her former attorneys withdrew 
from representing her several weeks prior to the one-year anniversary of Mr. Jensen's 
death. Record at 35, 52. That is appropriate because the Labor Commission presumably 
cannot make a determination in favor of Mrs. Jensen that would be binding on her former 
attorneys and, given the far more substantial expenses, burdens, delays, and risks of a 
civil lawsuit that she very well may be prove unable to bear, or even undertake,12 Mrs. 
Jensen has serious reasons for concern that this action is her only viable opportunity for 
recovering benefits to which she is entitled for her husband's death. 
On the only issue before the Labor Commission, the rights of Mrs. Jensen vis-a-
vis the employer and carrier, Mrs. Jensen's diligence in seeking counsel and pursuing her 
l2Justifying the risk and expense of a civil lawsuit is even more difficult because 
of the relatively small level of benefits that Mrs. Jensen is entitled to given the fact that 
Mr. Jensen was only earning 18 cents per mile, Record at 56, which had yielded only 
$7853.76 over the course of about six months of employment in 2001, Record at 3. 
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claim should only have been considered in her favor. Indeed, in the context of workers' 
compensation, a claimant's reliance on counsel has been recognized as an additional 
basis for consideration of an arguably late claim. See State Compensation Insurance 
Fund v. Foulds, 167 Colo. 123, 445 P.2d 716, 718-19 (1968); Gulf Casualty Co. v. 
Hughes. 230 S.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). 
The employer and carrier also suffer in any comparison of their egregious wrongs 
with any possible mistake by Mrs. Jensen's former attorneys. Only the employer and 
carrier had a conflict of interest with Mrs. Jensen and their violations of her rights were 
consistent with an intent fueled by self-interest to avoid her right to benefits. The reward 
of their misconduct here encourages such disregard for claimants. Further, only the 
employer and carrier intentionally and fully took on primary responsibility for the risk of 
paying workers' compensation benefits to obtain corresponding economic benefits 
associated with Mr. Jensen's work. Finally, only the employer was obligated to protect 
Mrs. Jensen with insurance by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201, and the carrier assumed 
that risk. 
If there had been no other failures on the part of the employer and carrier, Mrs. 
Jensen's claim should be considered and paid on its merits for these reasons alone. 
However, the violations of the employer and carrier, and the error of the Labor 
Commission's decision, went further than that. 
The Labor Commission decision recognized that "[o]ther than the summary 
information contained in the [March 8, 2002 denial] letter itself, Truck Insurance 
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Exchange provided no other information to Mrs. Jensen." Record at 109; see Record at 
27, 57. Thus, the Commission recognized that Mrs. Jensen had been deprived of the use 
of official Form 89, Record at 58, 110, which would have provided her, among other 
valuable information, this critical warning about the ease with which she could obtain 
assistance with her claim from the Labor Commission: 
NOTICE TO THE CLAIMANT: If you are in disagreement with the denial 
and cannot resolve your differences by talking with the carrier and/or your 
treating physician, you can file for mediation and/or application for hearing. 
To obtain an application for mediation and/or hearing, contact the Utah 
Labor Commission, Division of Industrial Accident at (801) 530-6800 or 
(800) 530-5090. 
Record at 58 (Addendum 1). The Commission concluded that "it was permissible for 
Truck Insurance Exchange to use a letter, rather than Form 89, to deny Mrs. Jensen's 
claim" based on this reasoning: "The [Rule R612-1-3.E] is not a model of clarity, but it 
does not mandate use of Form 89. It also allows other written forms of notice of denial. 
Furthermore, the Industrial Accidents Division has permitted use of other written forms 
of denial in the past." Record at 110. On this point, the Labor Commission failed to 
address the important issue of substance underlying this issue of form. The critical fact is 
not that the carrier sent a letter; it is that the carrier sent the letter without including in it 
the conspicuous warning and information required by Form 89. 
The language of the R612-1-3.E is mandatory ("This form is used[13] by insurance 
l3In contrast, R612-1-3, uses the language "may be used," rather than "is used" in 
connection with a different form in subpart R (Release to Return to Work - Form 110). 
A different rule appears to make even Form 110 mandatory. See R612-2-3 .D. Other 
statements in R612-1-3 regarding forms that "must be used" in certain ways do not stand 
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carriers or self-insured employers to notify the claimant that his or her claim, in whole or 
in part, is denied and the reason(s) why the claim is being denied") and additional 
language in that part of the rule does not "allow[] other written forms of notice of 
denial," but rather merely underscores the obligation of the carrier to "complete its 
investigation within 45 days of receipt of the claim and . . . commence the payments of 
benefits or notify the claimant and the division in writing that the claim, in whole or in 
part, is denied." In stark contrast, R612-1-3.F, which relates to the "further-
investigation" notice that the carrier failed to give Mrs. Jensen and the Commission, 
provides that "this form or letter containing similar information is to be filed within 21 
days . . . . " Emphasis added. In drafting the rule, the Commission appears to have 
determined that allowing an exception at the less-important stage of a "further-
investigation" notice was not merited at the more-important stage of denial of a claim. 
But had the Commission also decided to include such an exception in R612-1-3.E, 
certainly it would have similarly required that any form of denial letter used in place of 
Form 89 contain similar information as well. See also R612-1-7 ("written notice on a 
division form or letter containing similar information"). R612-1-3.V underscores that the 
importance of use of the Labor Commissions forms by providing that "V. The division 
in contrast to the requirement for use of Official Form 089, but in support of it, because 
the style convention used almost exclusively in the rule when a form is required is to 
state in the first sentence what the form "is used" for and to state in a second sentence 
how the form "must be used" only if such an additional requirement related to the 
specific way it is used applies. In the context of the rule, "is used" and "must be used" 
are synonymous. 
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may approve change of any of the above forms upon public notice. Carriers may print 
these forms or approved versions." Although the Labor Commission may have 
"permitted use of other written forms of notice of denial in the past," in circumstances 
that are not disclosed in the decision or in the record, the Labor Commission did not 
indicate, the carrier has not claimed, and the record does not support that any public 
notice and approval of the carrier's form of denial in this case occurred. 
If indeed past unwritten practice of the workers' compensation division has been 
to permit employers and carriers to freely circumvent the rule, that is all the more reason 
now for soundly rejecting the argument, that after promulgating the carefully crafted 
notice required in Official Form 89 and a related rule for public notice and approval of 
changes, the Labor Commission, after the fact, may permit the employer and carrier to 
advantage themselves by depriving the employee's beneficiaries of the benefit of the rule 
and the Form it provides for. Allowing not only a different form, but a different form 
that deprives the claimant of the important notice required through R612-1-3.E14 
unwisely and improperly encourages the employer and carrier unilaterally to render Form 
89 a nullity. 
In any event, as a simple matter of equity, the sketchy form and content of the 
carrier's denial is additional grounds for forgiving Mrs. Jensen's minor delay in filing her 
claim. Recognition of the legal failure of the carrier in this regard is not essential to Mrs. 
l4Use of the Official Form 089 would also have implicitly warned Mrs. Jensen of 
need to file the claim "within the statute of limitations." See Record at 58. 
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Jensen's claim, particularly in view of the Commission's finding that Mrs. Jensen was 
not provided similar information in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(5). But 
the denial letter does reflect another aspect of the employer's and carrier's unbroken 
pattern of disregard for Mrs. Jensen's rights. 
II 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-417(3) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Mrs. Jensen respectfully submits that questions relating to the constitutionality of 
the one-year period permitted for workers' compensation death claims, and related 
questions of constitutionality that would be raised by denying to dependents in death 
cases similarly appropriate time limitations as afforded to employees, or dependents for 
benefits that accrued while the employee was still alive, should not be reached15 because 
her claim should be considered timely in her circumstances of excusable and minimal 
delay under the equitable tolling and estoppel exceptions appropriate to the Workers' 
Compensation Act or other construction of the limitation.16 In the alternative, Mrs. 
Jensen contends that application of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) to deny her claim 
would be unconstitutional. The Labor Commission ruled that it "lacks authority to 
15Even so, it would be appropriate for the legislature to visit the issue to establish a 
limitation appropriate to the important interest involved. 
l6For example, the serious constitutional issues could be avoided or remedied in 
this case if Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) were construed only as requiring an 
application for hearing to be filed within one year of the death when the death due to an 
industrial accident does not result until after the six-year period, see Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-417(2), generally allowed for claims arising out of industrial claims. 
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consider such constitutional issues." Record at 110; see Avis v. Board of Review, 837 
P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
No legitimate governmental interest is advanced by the strikingly and 
inconsistently short one-year provision of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) for death 
claims, particularly in view of the six-year provision of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2) 
for other workers' compensation claims. 
The Utah Supreme Court has just addressed related principles in Judd v. Drezga, 
2004 UT 91, P.3d (November 5, 2004). In a 3-2 decision, the court upheld the 
medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap and observed: 
This court has held, since our decision in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), that citizens of Utah have a right to a 
remedy for an injury. Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay." Utah Const, art. I, § 1 1 . . . . 
Our past jurisprudence has clearly and firmly established the following test 
for violations of the Open Courts Clause: 
[Sjection 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an 
effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for 
vindication of his constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the 
remedy abrogated.... 
. . . [I]f there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation 
of the remedy . . . may be justified only if there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal 
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
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Judd next argues that section 78-14-7.1 violates the Utah Constitution's 
uniform operation of laws provision found in article I, section 24. This provision 
guards against discrimination within the same class and helps ensure that statutes 
establishing or recognizing rights for certain classes do so reasonably given the 
statutory objectives. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984). We 
employ heightened scrutiny under article I, section 24 when reviewing legislation 
that "implicates" rights under article I, section 11 [the Open Courts Clause]. Lee, 
867 P.2d at 581. Sustaining legislation against an article I, section 24 challenge 
alleging that one's rights under the Open Courts Clause are constitutionally 
discriminated against requires the court to find that the challenged legislation "(1) 
is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative 
objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative 
purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." 
Id at 583. Although it causes great hardship for a small, severely injured group of 
plaintiffs, we find that the damage cap is reasonable, and it substantially furthers 
and is reasonably necessary to the legislative goal of decreasing health care costs 
and ensuring the continued availability of health care. 
Next, Judd challenges the legislatively-imposed cap on quality of life 
damages on the ground that it violates Athan's right to due process under article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Generally, we apply a rational basis test in 
substantive due process cases. Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'v of Utah, 681 P.2d 
199, 206 (Utah 1984). However, this rational basis test is replaced by a more 
stringent test in cases where the rights impacted by the legislation are deemed to 
be "fundamental." Id Judd argues that we should use such heightened scrutiny in 
Athan's case. However, because article I, section 11 rights are not properly 
characterized as "fundamental," we will apply the rational basis test. See 
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 359-60 (citing Berry, 717 P.2d at 677). 
Id. at fflf 10-11, If 19, Tf 30. The close vote in Judd underscores the importance of the 
nature of the claim that Mrs. Jensen asserts in this action. With no countervailing 
legislative purpose such as the medical malpractice "crisis" addressed in Judd, with the 
constitutional significance of death claims recognized in art. XVI, § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution, and the close relationship of death claims and injury claims in worker's 
compensation (which easily can be intertwined in the case of a single worker), the 
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remarkably short and disparate time period of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) is 
improper.17 
Although the employer and carrier has cited Avis, 837 P.2d 584, as having 
"decided that workers' compensation statutes of limitation do not violate the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution, or equal protection," see Respondents' Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Disposition (6/15/04), III (thirteenth page), this case is far 
different than Avis. Avis involved a three-year limitation period and a claim for 
permanent partial impairment filed over 22 years after the industrial accident. The court 
also emphasized that the limitation "classifies injured workers in a reasonable manner in 
that all injured workers are subject to the same limitation period within which to file a 
claim for compensation." Id. at 588. In this case, the employer and carrier seek 
application of the far shorter and more suspect period of only one-year to a vital and 
important claim of constitutional significance for injuries resulting in death. See Utah 
Constitution art. XVI, § 5; Hailing v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78, 81 
(1927). The period is also inexplicably only half the amount of time permitted for filing 
wrongful death claims despite the fact that workers' compensation matters are resolved 
in the less-demanding environment of an administrative proceeding and do not involve 
the issues of fault, often complex, attendant in civil actions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-28. 
17Similarly, no reason exists for considering death workers' compensation claims to 
be of a different class than nondeath claims for purposes of information provided to the 
claimant under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(5) (2001). 
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In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074, construed a one-year 
limitation in a statute narrowly in order to permit a claim—arguably more narrowly than 
suggested by the statute's plain language—so as to avoid the constitutional problem 
presented by the one-year period involved even though the petitioner in that case actually 
could have pursued the claim, which was for adjudication of marriage, over the course of 
thirteen years. See id. at %% 17-30; see also id. at f^ 52 (Russon, J., dissenting). The court 
based its holding in part on a Texas decision finding that a similar one-year provision for 
commencement of actions violated equal protection because the distinction between 
"ceremoniously" versus "informally" married couples was not sufficiently related to a 
legitimate governmental interest. Id at f^ f 27-28. The court further noted the decision of 
the United States Supreme Court in Mills v. HabluetzeL 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982) 
unanimously holding that a one-year period to file a claim regarding the legitimacy of a 
child violated equal protection under the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution because the time period was too short in light of the important rights 
involved. Id at ^ 29. 
Applying a one-year provision against Mrs. Jensen is irrational. Had Mr. Jensen 
survived in a coma for a little over three months after the accident until May 5, 2002, 
Mrs. Jensen claim for death benefits would unquestionably have been timely. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3). Related claims for other types of workers' compensation 
benefits (e.g. temporary total, etc.) would not even be necessary until January 2008. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2). Such an arbitrary distinction does not justify 
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destroying the sort of critical and constitutionally significant right asserted by Mrs. 
Jensen. See Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1364-1365 (Utah App. 1993) (higher 
scrutiny of limitation of constitutionally significant claims; three-month habeas corpus 
limitations period without exception for excusable delay held unreasonable and 
unconstitutional). As in Mills, workers' compensation death claims do not involve 
evidence that will invariably be lost in only one year or that the passage of 12 months 
will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims. See 456 U.S. at 101. 
The substantial issues of constitutionality are ample reason for the Court to apply 
the principles of In re Marriage of Gonzalez. 2000 UT 28, ffi[ 23, 30, 1 P.3d 1074 and 
Vigos, 2000 UT 2, ^ 8, 993 P.2d 2072, and determine that the constitutional issues need 
not be reached because Mrs. Jensen should be entitled to benefits due to the employer's 
and carrier's failures. 
Ill 
DEATH BENEFITS SHOULD BE AWARDED 
It was about six o'clock on a Saturday evening. Instead of being with his family, 
with his wife of 36 years, Mr. Jensen is dutifully driving a load of doors for his employer 
on a desolate stretch of highway outside of Butte, Montana. He loses control and slides 
across an icy road. Seconds later, the truck has rolled, crushing his head and pinning him 
to the ground in freezing temperatures. That is how he is left at least for the next half 
hour, and even after his body is finally removed, his blood and tissue is left on the truck 
where his head was crushed. It is clear to the highway patrol that Mr. Jensen died of 
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those injuries, but somewhere in the course of all that, the nonphysician deputy coroner 
surmises without benefit of an autopsy that Mr. Jensen had a heart attack. No evidence 
in the record of the "investigation" of the employer and carrier supports that conclusion. 
The employer and carrier, in turn, decide not to have an autopsy performed or to 
do anything else to help establish the truth. In terms of their self-interest, it is better for 
them to have an answer that they might be able to pass off to the unsophisticated widow 
as an excuse for not paying than it is to have the answer that is right. Indeed, their 
proffered "excuse" is no reason at all for not paying the compensation due. Mr. Jensen 
was near the end of a long day of driving and in the midst of deadly icy conditions that 
ended up leaving him crushed and pinned under a truck in a remote location, robbed by 
his employment of his hope for emergency medical assistance and modern medical 
treatment. "Heart attack" or not, death benefits are long overdue. See Workers' 
Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jensen died in a violent work accident. Long before any arguable failure by 
Mrs. Jensen, the employer and carrier violated rights of Mrs. Jensen at every turn. 
Among other things, the carrier was obligated under Utah Admin. Code Ann. R612-1-7 
to "commence the payment of benefits" because, at the end of its investigation, it had 
found no reason(s) why the claim could be denied. The dismissal of petitioner's 
workers' compensation claim as untimely should be reversed, and death benefits should 
be ordered paid to Mrs. Jensen. 
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Dated: November 8, 2004. 
H. Dennis Piercey ) 
938 Greenwood Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 582-6495 
Attorney for Petitioner Vivian Jensen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on November 8,2004,1 mailed two copies of this BRIEF OF 
PETITIONER VIVIAN JENSEN to: 
Carrie T. Taylor 
David H. Tolk 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Attorneys for Respondents Diamond Express and Truck 
Insurance Exchange 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 144600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4600 
Attorney for the Utah Labor Commission 
fJ Ju-^P. 
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»nn089 10/00 ST ATE OF UTAH-LABOR COMMISSION / ;^ : 
Division of Industrial Accidents 
P.O. Box 146610 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor . . . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 : : . : ; ^ 
EMPLOYEE NOTIFICATION OF DENIAL OR 
PARTIAL DENIA^ OF CLAIM 
nployee: Date of Allege* Injury: 
idress: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Phone Number: City, 
ate:
 m mmm _ . Social Security: Employer: 
. , _ _____ Insurance Carrier: 
_____„ Date Carrier was Notified of Claim: 
aim #: _, Date of Denial: Adjuster:. 
ljuster's Address; . _ _______ Adjuster's Phone Number^ 
NOTICE TO THE CLAIMANT: If you are in disagreement with the denial and cannot resolve your 
differences by talking with the carrier and/or your treating physician, you can file for mediation 
and/or application for hearing. To obtain an application for mediation and/or a hearing, contact the Utah 
Labor Commission, Division of Industrial Accident at (801) 530-6800 or (800) 530-5090. 
ease check appropriate reason for denial (if a partial denial is issued, please refer to the section below). 
Failure by an employee claiming benefits to sign releases for medical information. 
Injury/Occupational Disease did not occur within the scope of employment. 
Medical information does not support the claim. 
Claim not filed within the statute of limitations. 
Claimant is not an employee. 
Claimant has failed to cooperate in the investigation of the claim. 
Pre-existing condition (Please be very specific). . 
Other - A specific reason must be givcn,_ 
ease check appropriate reason for partial denial. 
Tested positive to a drug/alcohol chemical test -Medicals only paid. 
Disputed validity - Medicals only paid. 
Disputed validity - Compensation only paid. 
case give a brief explanation of any item checked above):_ _. 
LABOR COMMISSION RULE GOVERNING ACCEPTANCE/DENIAL OF THE CLAIM 
12-1-7. Acceptance/Denial of a Claim. (Refer to the Utah Labor Commission Workers' Compensation Rules for complete test) 
L. Upon receiving a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall promptly investigate 
claim and begin payment of compensation within 21 days from the date of notification of a valid claim or the insurance carrier or sclf-
ured employer shall send the claimant and the division written notice on a division form or letter containing similar information, within 
days of notification, that funher investigation is needed stating the reason(s) for funher investigation. Each insurance earner or self-insured 
ployer shall complete its investigation within 45 days of receipt of the claim and shall commence the payment of benefits or notify the 
imant and division in writing that the claim is denied and the rcason(s) why die claim is being denied. 
.. The payment of compensation shall be considered overdue if not paid within 21 days of a valid claim or within the 45 days of 
estigation unless denied. 
', Failure to make payment or to deny a claim within the 45 day time period without good cause shall result in a referral of the insurance 
npany to the Insurance Department for appropriate disciplinary action and maybe cause for revocation of the self-insurance certification 
a self-insured employer. 
opies must be sent to: Labor Commission, Employee Addendum at 9 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
VIVIAN JENSEN, widow of 
HENNING SVEN JENSEN, 
Applicant, 
v. 
DIAMOND EXPRESS LLC and 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendants. 
Vivian Jensen asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Hann's 
dismissal of Mrs. Jensen's claim for death benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the 
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Henning Jensen died on January 26,2002. On May 5,200 3, Mrs. Jensen, his widow, filed an 
Application For Hearing with the Commission to compel Diamond Express and its insurance carrier, 
Truck Insurance Exchange, to pay death benefits to Mrs. Jensen for Mr. Jensen's death. On October 
2,2003, Judge Harm dismissed Mrs. Jensen's Application because it was not filed within one year of 
Mr. Jensen's death, as required by §34A-2-417(3) of the Act. 
In requesting Commission review of Judge Hann's dismissal of her claim, Mrs. Jensen 
contends that, under the facts of this case, the Commission should recognize an exception to the one-
year limitation of §34A-2-417(3). Alternatively, Mrs. Jensen, contends that application of §34A-2~ 
417(3)'s one-year limitation period would be unconstitutional under the facts of her claim. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Henning Jensen died on January 26,2002, while employed as a truck driver for Diamond. At 
the time of his death, Mr. Jensen was married to Vivian Jensen. In a letter dated March 8, 2002, 
Truck Insurance Exchange notified Mrs. Jensen that it would not pay her any workers' compensation 
death benefits for her husband's death. Other than the summary information contained in the letter 
itself, Truck Insurance Exchange provided no other information to Mrs. Jensen. 
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Immediately after receiving Truck Insurance Exchange's letter, Mrs. Jensen engaged the 
services of attorneys in Missouri to pursue her claim. However, on October 31,2002, the Missouri 
attorneys withdrew, leaving Mrs. Jensen with the understanding that she had two years from the date 
of her husband's death to file an Application For Hearing. Several months later, Mrs. Jensen 
obtained the services of her current attorney, who filed an Application on her behalf on May 5,2003. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Sections 34A-2-401 and 34A-2-414 of the Act provide benefits to the dependants of workers 
who die from work-related accidental injuries. However, §34A-2-417(3) of the Act bars a claim for 
death benefits if an application for hearing is not filed within one year of the date of the worker's 
death. 
It is undisputed that Mrs. Jensen did not file her Application for death benefits until more 
than one year had elapsed from the date of her husband's death. However, she justifies the untimely 
filing of her Application on the grounds that Truck Insurance Exchange failed to use the proper form 
(Industrial Accidents Form 89, "Notice of Denial of Claim,") to notify her that her claim was denied. 
Instead, Truck Insurance Exchange used a simple letter for that purpose. The Commission has 
carefully reviewed Rule R612-1-3.E, which defines Form 89 and explains its use. The rule is not a 
model of clarity, but it does not mandate use of Form 89. It also allows other written forms of notice 
of denial. Furthermore, the Industrial Accidents Division has permitted use of other written forms of 
denial in the past. The Commission therefore concludes it was permissible for Truck Insurance 
Exchange to use a letter, rather than Form 89, to deny Mrs. Jensen's claim. 
Mrs. Jensen also points out that Truck Insurance Exchange failed to comply with §34A-2-
407(5) of the Act by providing her with copies of the "Employer's First Report of Accident" and 
"Employees' Guide to Workers' Compensation." As a preliminary matter, the Commission notes 
that §34A-2-407(5) requires the referenced documents be provided to "employees." Arguably, the 
statute's directive does not extend to "dependents" such as Mrs. Jensen. But apart from this question 
of semantics, it is undisputed that Mrs. Jensen was aware by March 8, 2002, that Truck Insurance 
Exchange had denied her claim. She then immediately obtained legal representation to challenge 
that denial. Her legal counsel later withdrew and, unfortunately, gave her incorrect advice regarding 
the filing deadline. Under these circumstances, the Commission cannot attribute Mrs. Jensen's 
failure to timely file her Application to Truck Insurance Exchange. 
Mrs. Jensen also contends that §34A-2-417(3)'s one-year limitation is unconstitutional as it 
applies to this case. The Commission does not agree with that argument, but in any event lacks 
authority to consider such constitutional issues. 
In summary, the Commission is sympathetic to Mrs. Jensen's unfortunate situation, but 
believes it must apply §34A-2-417(3)'s one-year limitation as a bar to Mrs. Jensen's claim. 
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ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Harm's dismissal of Mrs. Jensen's Application For Hearing 
and denies Mrs. Jensen's motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this dQ day of April, 2004. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Vivian Jensen, widow of Henning Jensen, Case No. 03-0489, was mailed first class postage prepaid 
this j f ^ d a y of April, 2004, to the following: 
VIVIAN JENSEN 
1449 WEST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84104 
DIAMOND EXPRESS LLC 
4120 JACKSON STREET 
DENVER CO 80216 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
BOX 529 
SANDY UT 84091 
CARRIE TAYLOR, ATTORNEY 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
P O BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465 
H. DENNIS PIERCEY, ATTORNEY 
938 GREENWOOD TERRACE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
Sara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
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